This paper analyzes strategic interactions and contagion effects in peripheral countries of a monetary union. Using game theory and a cost-benefit analysis, the paper determines the set of equilibrium solutions under which country-specific shocks are transmitted to other member countries giving rise to contagion. Numerical simulations, obtained by a simple calibration of the model on some key Mediterranean countries of the Euro Zone, show the probabilities of contagion from Greece to Spain and Italy.
Introduction
The spectacular increase of sovereign risk premium in the Euro Area following the Greek debt explosion in 2009 and its impact on the sustainability of the European Monetary Union (EMU) have kindled research interest on contagion effects and risk of a systemic crisis in the Euro Zone.
The issue has also been of a major concern to European policymakers, and it has brought the containment of systemic financial crises to the center of an international policy debate.
There is now a substantial literature dealing with the European debt crisis, the bulk of it focusing on the role played by fiscal and financial variables in the outbreak of crisis.
1 There are also some recent papers focusing on the role spillover and contagion effects played in exacerbating the sovereign debt problems in the Euro Zone. 2 A major deficiency of this literature is that it still lacks a rigorous theoretical framework to understand the full set of events characterizing the sovereign debt crisis and contagion effects within the EMU. Some exceptions should however be mentioned. Bolton and Jeanne (2011) propose a model of contagious sovereign debt crises in financially integrated economies. Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) provide a model of Euro Zone crisis that combines the features of both second-and third-generation approaches to currency crisis. De Grauwe and Ji (2013) present a model of EMU sovereign crisis inspired by the Obstfeld (1996, 1997) model of self-fulfilling-speculative attacks. Canofari et al. (2012b) propose a model of crisis and contagion within monetary unions that combines the features of both first-and 1 See, e.g., Attinasi et al. (2009) , Barrios et al. (2009 ), Haugh et al. (2009 , Amisano and Tristani (2011), Bernoth et al. (2012) , Borgy et al. (2012) , Aizenman et al. (2013) . 2 See, e.g., Caceres et al. (2010) , Arezki et al. (2011), Favero and Missale (2011) , Hui and Chung (2011) , Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) , Constancio (2012 ), De Santis (2012 , Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2012), Metiu (2012), De Grauwe and Ji (2013) .
3 second-generation approaches to currency crisis.
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Our paper adds to the above strand of literature by providing a new theoretical framework to understand crises and contagion phenomena within monetary unions. Specifically, we apply game theory and a cost-benefit analysis to study voluntary exits and contagion effects in peripheral countries of a monetary union. The paper looks at two non-core, or periphery, countries of a large union and examines the role of strategic interactions and structural asymmetries in determining the set of equilibrium solutions following a country-specific shock.
The paper is organized as follows. We first discuss the theoretical framework. We then apply the model to the case of Euro Mediterranean countries to assess the probability of contagion under different assumptions about the exit costs. We finally summarize the main results.
The theoretical framework
To analyze voluntary exits and contagion effects in a monetary union, we look at a stochastic economy and a currency-union two-stage game where, conditional on the realization of exogenous shocks that cause deviations of the target variables from their preferred level, each member country can either choose to remain in the monetary union or exit by comparing the welfare losses arising from alternative optimal policy in each regimes. 4 Specifically, we consider a monetary union where two periphery member countries ( A and B ) strategically interact. Consistent with the second-generation approach, we also include a 3 A detailed analytical discussion of the basic theoretical approaches to currency and financial crises can be found in Piersanti (2012) . 4 This two-stage approach has been used also for endogenous coalition formation in a monetary union and for monetary union creation (see e.g. van Aarle, 2002 van Aarle, , 2003 van Aarle, , 2006 Kohler, 2002; Kempf and von Thadden, 2008; Michalak et al., 2008) . A more formal exposition of this kind of game is provided by Ray and Vohra (1999) .
costly escape clause in the policymaker's loss function. The social loss is given by a standard function defined over the output gap and inflation (measured by the change in nominal exchange rate).
Formally, measuring all variables in logs, letting the nominal exchange rate be defined as the price of the foreign currency in terms of the local currency and assuming that prices are fixed for simplicity, we can summarize the model structure by the following equations.
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The policymaker's loss function in The aggregate supply for country i is given by
letting output be a function of the real wage and nominal rigidities be present in the form of a one period wage contract, where
denote the actual and the expected change in the exchange rate for country i at time t , respectively.
5 A more detailed discussion is in Canofari et al. (2012a) . Similar theoretical structures have been used by Masson (1999) , Buiter et al. (2001) , Berger and Wagner (2005) , Canofari et al. (2012b) . 6 The cost  may have several sources and could reflect, for example, the loss of international reputation and anti-inflation credibility, voter dissension, or removal from the office.
The international demand for the goods produced in country i , Goods market equilibrium in each country leads to
which can be rewritten as in this case, they will have no incentive to exit and divert from the agreed fixed parities.
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To keep things simple we now normalize the output target levels, the world exchange rate and the nominal fixed parities to one 8 and focus on a currency-union game where, following a country-specific shock, each country can choose between two actions: either choosing to remain in the monetary union and set 0 = s  , denoted by No exit, or choosing to leave it and set 0  s , denoted by Exit. Therefore, the key issue for the authorities is to find the value of the shock at which it is optimal to operate a regime shift. However, as policy decisions are not independent in this setting, an interaction between the policymakers optimizing behavior necessarily develops, and this can lead to multiple equilibria and contagion effects across countries.
The solutions to this game arise from strategy profiles that form a Nash equilibrium. This requires solving first the model to obtain the optimal policies and corresponding losses for each country given the strategy followed by the other country, and then finding the incentive to deviate from it to check if it is or not a Nash equilibrium. 
TABLE 1 --Payoff Matrix
No exit
In the table i j L denotes the loss for policymaker i in regime j . The table can be used to find the unique or multiple Nash equilibrium solutions of the game; equilibria are stated formally in the following.
Proposition 1 Regime E is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
0 > A E A B D L L  and 0 > B E B A D L L  .
Regime N is a Nash equilibrium if and only if 0 >
A N A A D L L  and 0 > B N B B D L L  . Regime B
D is a Nash equilibrium if and only if 0 >
A B D A E L L  and 0 > B B D B N L L  . Regime A
The alternative losses are computed solving the policymakers' optimization problems in each regime. Under the Exit option, optimal policy for country 
To preserve simplicity and to provide a closed-form solution of the model, we now restrict the attention to the case of symmetry between countries.  , meaning that the shock impacts on country A . Then, using (7)- (10) Proof. See Appendix.
The interpretation underlying Proposition 2 is straightforward. If the shock is small, the stability of monetary union is preserved. A medium-size shock provides incentive to devalue only for the affected country. If the shock is large enough to be above a threshold value, contagion is observed. The proposition also suggests that both multiple equilibria and the perverse case, where only the country not hit by the shock chooses to exit, cannot occur.
Domino effects in Euro Mediterranean countries
This section focuses on contagion risks in EU Mediterranean countries. We look at an heterogeneous-country version of our model and examine the domino effects of an idiosyncratic shock hitting Greece   G , to estimate the probability of contagion to Spain   S and Italy   I .
In order to perform numerical simulations, we make use of a simple parameterization of 12 Note that 1 > Q as long as  is smaller than one. The first term under the root is larger than one; the second term is always larger than one for admissible values of parameters. our model under different assumptions about the exist costs. Specifically, we relied on estimates provided by Canofari et al. (2012b) The parameterization for the baseline calibration is summarized in Table 2 . Table 3 . The results reveal that the probability of contagion from Greece to Spain is higher than the probability of contagion to Italy. Hence, if Italy exists due to contagion from Greece, Spain will also exit, but the reverse does not necessarily hold.
TABLE 2 -Calibration
They also show that the highest probability of a full domino effect   35% attains at the lowest opting out cost. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have used game theory and a cost-benefit analysis to model contagion and domino 
Appendix -Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Write the incentive to move between alternative regimes in a compact form as: .
